The Allocation of Attention to Learning of Goal-Directed Actions: A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework Focusing on the Basal Ganglia by E. A. Franz
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 21 December 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00535
The allocation of attention to learning of goal-directed
actions: a cognitive neuroscience framework focusing on
the basal ganglia
E. A. Franz*
Division of Science, Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
Edited by:
Mattie Tops, VU University
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Reviewed by:
Bernhard Hommel, Leiden University,
Netherlands
Mattie Tops, VU University
Amsterdam, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
E. A. Franz, Department of
Psychology, University of Otago,
Level 4William James Building, 275




The present paper builds on the idea that attention is largely in service of our actions. A
framework and model which captures the allocation of attention for learning of goal-directed
actions is proposed and developed.This framework highlights an evolutionary model based
on the notion that rudimentary functions of the basal ganglia have become embedded into
increasingly higher levels of networks which all contribute to adaptive learning. Supporting
the proposed model, background literature is presented alongside key evidence based on
experimental studies in the so-called “split-brain” (surgically divided cerebral hemispheres),
and selected evidence from related areas of research. Although overlap with other existing
findings and models is acknowledged, the proposed framework is an original synthesis of
cognitive experimental findings with supporting evidence of a neural system and a carefully
formulated model of attention. It is the hope that this new synthesis will be informative
in fields of cognition and other fields of brain sciences and will lead to new avenues for
experimentation across domains.
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INTRODUCTION
William James famously stated “Everyone knows what attention
is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form,
of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or
trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of
its essence” (James, 1890/1918, p. 403–404; italics and bold added).
But, what is attention for? The present paper builds on the idea that
attention is largely in service of our actions. What follows is the
development of a framework and model of attention-for-action
derived from experimental evidence based on studies in the so-
called “split-brain” (surgically divided cerebral hemispheres) and
related studies on fundamental processes of the basal ganglia, with
a key focus on bimanual actions. A multilevel cognitive-neural sys-
tem of attention is built upon processes of a highly adaptive basal
ganglia-thalamic-cortical system.
Historically, studies on attention and conscious experience have
focused very much on the stimulus end of processing. One might
wonder whether our working definitions of attention might have
evolved differently had the focus been closer to the “other end,” an
issue raised many years ago by Neisser (1967). In a related vein,
Neumann (1987) considered focused attention in close relation to
action selection using a simple illustration of a person selectively
reaching for an apple from a tree, in the context of many other pos-
sible actions (or reaching movements to other apples) which could
have been performed (Franz, 2006). In a parallel development,
others have considered sensory effects as virtually the same as the
motor behavior associated with their occurrence, with a modified
notion of “ideomotor compatibility” forming the basis of recent
accounts in which “stimulus” and “response” are conceptualized as
reflecting one and the same perceptual representation (Hommel,
2010). The present account is consistent with these parallel devel-
opments, and began with the basic question: what is the relation
between attention and action? In delving into the literature, some
prescient insights of early scholars who probed the nature of this
relationship became apparent, and a second rather unavoidable
question also emerged: what is the relation between attention and
conscious experience? The present paper begins with a brief reca-
pitulation of those early insights. Using these two key questions as
guides, it follows with a brief review of initial experimental studies
on the “split-brain” and evidence from more recent experimen-
tation including studies from our own lab, culminating into the
proposed multilevel framework of attention which aims to address
the first question in detail, while also shedding some light on the
second one. I first provide some working definitions, clarification
of the present scope, and a summary of the proposed framework
that will then be elaborated along with supporting evidence.
Although consciousness is not the topic of this paper, its deriv-
ative (i.e., conscious experience) is referred to, which I define as
an organism’s dynamic awareness of stimulation, which may be
associated with sensations, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and
emotions. In my view, under normal circumstances most humans
possess the capacity for conscious experience and attentive behav-
ior (ala William James) and this can also be said of animals, at least
some of them, albeit to differing degrees. It is beyond the present
scope to attempt to define the constraints of this capacity in the
animal kingdom, or the difference in degree to which humans and
non-human animals possess consciousness. Importantly, atten-
tion evolved through millions of years of adaptive changes in a
dynamic environment, and in my view, experimentation is crucial
in order to capture and ultimately understand critical principles
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pertaining to time-slices of this process. Furthermore, in embrac-
ing the basic tenets of evolution my view is that the brain evolved in
an embodied manner through interactions with the environment,
which also implicates an embodied view of cognition (Franz, 2010;
Franz and McCormick, 2010; Franz and Gillett, 2011).
This framework highlights an evolutionary model based on the
notion that rudimentary brain functions have become embed-
ded into increasingly higher (i.e., more highly embedded) levels
of networks, with evolution reflected in phylogeny, ontogeny, and
adaptive learning. A multilevel attention system is summarized
herein in terms of three conceptualized levels (Figure 1): Level
(1) involves primarily exogenous inputs which essentially cap-
ture focused attention transiently when environmental stimuli
are salient, unexpected, novel, and/or have emotional significance,
so that rudimentary forms of learning first occur in a trial-and-
error manner, with eventual associations between sensory effects
and motor movements forming elemental action-effects percep-
tual codes; Level (2) reflects more elaborated forms of endogenous
attention in which processes of activation and inhibition enable for
sequencing and switching between available action-effects codes
(and procedural learning); and Level (3) which is further depen-
dent on endogenous (focused) attention performs a selection-like
function (built upon the rudimentary forms of association, acti-
vation, and inhibition at lower levels) while receiving strong influ-
ences of top-down effects related to prior experiences associated
with schemas, goals, and motivations. These processes result in
a hierarchy of perceptual codes with the highest levels represent-
ing goal-related actions, and also contributing to an “automaticity
loop” in which expertise and habits result through extensive learn-
ing. By“higher” it is meant that each level builds upon and embeds
the so-called “lower” ones; thus, there are no strict boundaries of
these conceptualized levels, with higher levels embedded upon and
elaborating processes of lower levels.
It is proposed that all levels depend critically on a highly adap-
tive basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical system of which dopamine is a
key neurotransmitter (among others). The different levels do not
FIGURE 1 |The proposed framework underlying an allocation of
attention system, presented in summarized form. Key processes are
highlighted in bold caps at each of the three conceptualized levels of the
system, and arrows indicate general direction of information flow, although all
levels are highly interacting with many feedback projections not shown
herein. An automaticity loop is shown in the upper right corner as an adaptive
module built primarily upon level 3 of the system. In the far left panel is a
depiction of the approximate proportion of focused attention versus
inattentional processes predicted to be involved at each conceptualized level.
AE, action-effects. See text for details.
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uniquely point to conscious or unconscious processes (Lamme,
2003), nor does the involvement of focused attention dictate any
particular mix of conscious versus unconscious processing. How-
ever, it is proposed that increasingly higher levels of processing
evolved with greater reliance on cortical networks; thus, the higher
level networks are built upon (i.e., evolved from) the more rudi-
mentary (subcortical) processes of the basal ganglia and their
feedback loops with the thalamus. Nonetheless, even lower levels
likely involve some cortical inputs, even though intrinsic circuits of
the basal ganglia, together with feedback connections with the thal-
amus, make up the basic functions of the lower levels of the system.
Key processes ascribed to these levels and their rudimentary forms
are described as “focused attention capture” and association (Level
1), activation and inhibition (Level 2), and selection (elaborated
forms of the combined effects of capture, association, activation,
and inhibition derived from lower levels).
The proposed framework has some overlap with specific fea-
tures of existing models in the literature, which I will attempt to
point out where known. However, to my knowledge, the forma-
tion of a system of allocation of focused attention built upon the key
proposed processes (capture, association, activation, inhibition),
in combination with a neural model describing an adaptive basal
ganglia-thalamic-cortical system, is original to this framework.
Two additional classes of constraints (not illustrated in Figure 1)
will be referred to as (1) response dependencies, defined as stimulus
or response constraints that limit the availability of information to
a processing network, and (2) unifying constraints, which condense
the information that is available within a processing network. Both
are described as influences on (and within) the proposed system.
The latter is viewed as the result of the brain’s in-built propensity
at all processing levels to unify information into coherent percep-
tions, thoughts, and actions, something that has been described
metaphorically as reflecting forms of conceptual binding, with
a loose analogy to binding properties in the brain (Franz, 2010;
Franz and McCormick, 2010). In sum, the proposed multilevel sys-
tem involves highly evolved networks that flexibly allocate focused
attention, ultimately shaping our conscious experience.
BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: SOME PRESCIENT INSIGHTS
In the 1950s Roger Sperry suggested an utmost challenge when he
stated “An analysis of our current thinking will show that it tends
to suffer generally from a failure to view mental activities in their
proper relation, or even in any relation, to motor behavior. The
remedy lies in further insight into the relationship between the
sensori-associative functions of the brain on the one hand and its
motor activity on the other” and furthermore,“the entire output of
our thinking machine consists of nothing but patterns of motor coor-
dination” (Sperry, 1952, p. 291). These ideas, which likely were
influenced by the behaviorism prevalent at the time, evolved later
into Sperry’s growing interest in mentalism, a pursuit of his for
nearly three decades following. But his statements about sensori-
associative functions and motor behavior struck me as key clues
that should be explored further.
The idea that the brain is a highly embedded sensorimotor
machine dates back to the writings of John Hughlings Jackson
based on his personal observations of clinical cases with apha-
sia and epilepsy among other random conditions, and informed
by evolutionary theory as espoused by his contemporary, Her-
bert Spencer. Hughlings Jackson’s (1884) basic claim was that
the brain is a large sensorimotor machine, with embedded levels
of sensorimotor representations, and with higher levels overrid-
ing and inhibiting lower levels. This idea grasped the imagina-
tion of scholars in Psychology, most notably that of William
James who referred to “psychical evolution” in terms of simple
sensory and motor elements, clearly acknowledging Hughlings
Jackson for the explanation that epileptic seizures capture “the
loss of consciousness. . .” due to the most highly organized brain
processes being exhausted and thrown out of gear. . .” (James,
1890/1918; Vol. 11, pp. 125–126).
Although in days of behaviorism, it was primarily the“stimulus-
to-motor-response” that was conceived as the general direction in
which sensory stimuli could influence behavior, further experi-
mental evidence and thought has led people to consider the sensory
effects of an action, whether they be kinesthetic (as suggested by
William James) or derived from other sensory modalities such as
audition and vision, as becoming part of a perceptual code for an
action. This view most closely resonates with the work of Bern-
hard Hommel, and is embraced in the present paper. To illustrate
the notion of “sensory effects” or “sensory consequences” consider
for example, a low level organism with its basic response mecha-
nisms. It responds to the environment, as in the photo response
of the flagella in multicellular volvocine algae (Solari et al., 2011).
People might argue about whether or not the organism is “aware”
of the consequences or effects of such responses (Thorndike, 1913),
but most would agree that with evolution came an increasing ten-
dency for animals to take note of, or become aware even in a most
rudimentary manner, that a response brings food or the avoidance
of pain (both of which can be considered sensory effects). One
might even argue that minimal levels of awareness brought about
the development of elemental units of knowledge, and eventually
increasing levels of learning, with memories formed in a Hebbian
(Hebb, 1949) sort of way. Indeed, the capacity for decision-making
about whether or not to respond in the same manner depending on
the internal or external milieu after millions of years of evolution
has become a hallmark of human behavior.
Referring again to Sperry’s earlier views, although articulated
in a manner that suggested independence from those of Hughlings
Jackson, they also clearly reflected a firm grounding in evolution-
ary theory and underlying sensorimotor processes, dating back
to his lucid descriptions of animals lower on the vertebrate scale
(i.e., salamanders and lower fishes) as having a nervous system
concerned primarily with motor activity, with sensation and per-
ception largely serving the guidance of responses. Sperry further
suggested that this should be similar in man, given that the operat-
ing principles are fundamentally the same, and that “Cerebration,
essentially, serves to bring into motor behavior additional refine-
ment, increased direction toward distant, future goals, and greater
over-all adaptiveness and survival value” (Sperry, 1952, p. 299).
While I also embrace this view, I would further clarify his refer-
ence to “cerebration” as cortical-subcortical networks and circuits,
emphasizing research from more recent decades which I will argue,
strongly implicates subcortical interactions as essential to a sys-
tem which allocates our attention to action, in which the basal
ganglia and their connective circuits with the cortex, and loops
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with the thalamus are of primary importance. Notably, other
subcortical structures such as the cerebellum and hippocampus
are undoubtedly also involved, but will not be highlighted in the
present paper.
ORIGINAL SPLIT-BRAIN EXPERIMENTS IN HUMANS: A
PLATFORM FOR THE PRESENT ACCOUNT
Key clues about focused attention, and also unifying constraints
and response dependencies (to be explained further), stem from
initial investigations into the so-called “split-brain.” The medical
puzzle of how to ameliorate the bilateral spread of seizures associ-
ated with intractable epilepsy led to the procedure which involves
surgical separation of the left and right sides of the cerebral fore-
brain commissures. Performed only in rare cases of severe seizures
in an attempt to prevent their rapid spread between the two cere-
bral hemispheres of the brain this procedure also led to remarkable
examples of generosity on the part of surgical patients willing
to participate in experiments which eventually would completely
revise scientific understanding of the human brain. Commissuro-
tomy, one form of split-brain, involves surgical separation of an
estimated 200 million direct interhemispheric white matter tracts
comprising the corpus callosum, in addition to the anterior com-
missure and the posterior (often called hippocampal) commissure,
whereas callosotomy refers to the surgical separation of the corpus
callosum alone (Levy et al., 1972). In some references these terms
are used interchangeably, but inappropriately so, even though the
functional consequences may be similar in some contexts.
Myers and Sperry (1958) noted that clinical neurologists
observed intellectual deficits in patients of these procedures while
also pointing out the curious disagreement that “actual observa-
tions on the effect of complete surgical section or of total agenesis
of the corpus callosum in man and other animals have indicated
a surprising absence of deficit” (citing some well-known sources
including Bruce,1890;Akelaitis,1944; Bridgman and Smith,1945),
clearly revealing that further investigation was necessary in an
attempt to solve this paradox. However, Sperry’s initial writings
on the split-brain suggest that his own experiments involved cats
or rhesus monkeys (Glickstein and Sperry, 1959, 1960; Schrier and
Sperry, 1959), not humans.
Our understanding of the “split-brain” in humans took a great
leap forward with initial studies led by Michael Gazzaniga using
clever techniques of lateralization including tachistoscopic pre-
sentation in the case of vision and stereognosis in the case of
manual perception. Initial visual studies on humans with commis-
surotomy involved presenting images in the form of light flashes,
letters, or words, to the left and/or right visual fields separately
using tachistoscopic presentation to attempt to ensure separation
of input to the two hemispheres. Those tests reinforced a most
interesting finding, that the two visual fields are mapped to sepa-
rate cerebral hemispheres, with the left visual field mapped to the
right hemisphere and the right visual field mapped to the left hemi-
sphere, illustrating a disconnection (also called “deconnexion”) of
visual fields (Gazzaniga et al., 1962).
W.J., one of the three commissurotomy participants of those
initial studies, could locate points of tactile stimulation on the
fingers of either hand using touches of the thumb on the same
hand, even with a 5-s delay following the tactile stimulation, but
could not cross-locate such points with either hand to the other
despite his ability to locate points stimulated on the head, face,
and upper neck with either hand (suggesting bilateral wiring of
the involved systems in the latter cases). He could produce tap-
ping movements with each hand after being tapped on that same
hand by an experimenter, although when tapped on one hand he
could not always copy by producing the number of taps with the
opposite hand (Gazzaniga et al., 1962, 1963). Those findings fur-
ther pointed to a lateralization of both input and output of the
distal manual extremities, with each cerebral hemisphere receiv-
ing primary input from the contralateral hand/fingers, owning
some representation (memory) of that hand’s interactions with
the environment, and projecting motor commands to that same
(contralateral) hand. Decades of further study further suggested
in other commissurotomy patients that the two hemispheres
cannot directly compare visual or tactile stimulus information
presented in a lateralized manner (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 1995), con-
tributing to the host of evidence revealing disconnection in both
visual and manual modalities. These examples illustrate important
response dependencies which limit the availability of information
to a particular system, or network (in this case, a cerebral hemi-
sphere), further influencing the system of attention allocation for
action.
Other clever tasks invented by Gazzaniga et al., 1963; p. 211)
include presenting light taps “applied doubly, i.e., at two separate
points simultaneously on opposite sides of the body, occasionally
at corresponding symmetrical points, but more often at non-
symmetrical points.” Although those points could be mapped
and responded to in the manner described above, “when a sub-
sequent verbal description of the two stimulus points was asked
for, those on the left side could not be reported. This was true
in spite of the fact that the subject had correctly found the point
of stimulation with his left hand.” Thus, what was a conscious
experience, as indicated by the left hand, could not be verbally
reported (by the right hemisphere), again illustrating a response
dependency and what has become perhaps the most important
and influential finding in split-brain research and neurology in
general (also critically informed by the work of famous neurol-
ogist, Paul Broca). Specifically, the left hemisphere of the brain
houses the speech center, at least in the typical case of the major-
ity of people who are right-handed (and the present review refers
primarily to the typical case). While some manual responses could
be made to information in the right hemisphere, speech responses
could not, leading to the conclusion that the right hemisphere
might have a level of awareness of its contents and can make
responses as long as they are not via the disconnected speech
hemisphere.
A complementary type of function was described by Levy
et al. (1972), with the left hand showing clear problems in pro-
ducing responses to verbal commands, although when presented
with non-verbal aides, the left hand was later able to learn to
respond appropriately (but findings were not always consistent),
and marked difficulty in making left hand movements to verbal
commands was also described in one of the younger patients with
commissurotomy, although it later disappeared (Gazzaniga and
Sperry,1967). Evidence that shoulder, elbow,and wrist movements
could be made to verbal commands with the inability specific to
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the left fingers, is suggestive of a problem in translating verbal com-
mands to the highly lateralized task of hand/finger movement. A
short period of mutism was also reported in two of the com-
missurotomy patients of Gazzaniga and Sperry (1967) perhaps
suggesting some reorganization or neuroplasticity. The researchers
stated, however,“that conscious awareness is commonly present in
the minor as well as in the major hemisphere and that the two sep-
arate spheres of conscious experience may proceed concurrently as
well as in alternation” (p. 134). Notably, even the simplest kind of
sensory information presented to the right hemisphere could not
be described verbally, often leading to confabulatory responses.
Although presenting stimulus information to the right hand or
right visual field presented no problems in drawing with the right
hand or stereognostic exploration by the right hand, when stimu-
lus material was presented to the right hemisphere via the left hand
or in the left half visual field, some of those initial patients were
able to make recognizable reproductions of very simple material
using the left hand, particularly in the case of basic cut-outs like
a circle, square or triangle, or alphabet letters, although this con-
trol by the minor hemisphere was reportedly inferior to that of
the speech dominant left hemisphere via the right hand (although
some increased ability was shown in later patients; Gazzaniga and
Sperry, 1967).
Key findings dating back to the original studies (Gazzaniga and
Sperry, 1965) revealed in patients with commissurotomy (and pre-
sumably also absent mass a intermedia) that the right and left
hemispheres work separately in perceptual, cognitive, learning,
and mnemonic activities, with verbal descriptions possible only in
the left hemisphere, even though good comprehension still occurs
in the right hemisphere as long as there was no verbal expression,
and this also leaves open the possibility that some unity of function
in the hemispheres occurs via sensory effects and/or their contri-
butions to perceptual representations. This possibility is further
consistent with evidence that there is understanding of spoken
instructions for retrieving objects with the left hand, and the sug-
gestion that the engrams for language comprehension are bilateral
even though speech output is only normally possible from the left
hemisphere (Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1965).
Perhaps illustrated best by well-known examples of J.W. made
by Michael Gazzaniga which are publically available on YouTube, a
word presented to the right hemisphere does not access the speech
system in the left hemisphere, but after drawing a picture of what
the word stands for (i.e., an object) J.W. informs his own left hemi-
sphere speech system of what the word is. He essentially sees the
answer he has drawn on the paper in front of him, and his left
hemisphere is then able to access the speech response. While such
examples reveal that J.W. can, in his right hemisphere, translate
from a visual image to a drawn picture even when that visual image
is in word form, he cannot directly access his speech output system
from his right hemisphere. It would appear that all that is missing
from the right hemisphere is a speech output system. On the basis
of such evidence, I will later argue that the response mode avail-
ability (i.e., speech or manual) might largely shape what content
of information becomes available to conscious awareness; thus,
response dependencies such as these shape our conscious expe-
rience in that they limit the information accessible for conscious
processing.
UNITY OF ATTENTION IN THE SPLIT-BRAIN
The capacity of each hemisphere to respond or attend to infor-
mation, either separately or in collaboration, is an issue of critical
importance. Following commissurotomy each hemisphere of the
brain can respond in a rapid manner by drawing a visually lateral-
ized presentation of a shape (such as a circle or square, or a 3-sided
rectangle in various orientations), and the two hemispheres can
produce such drawings simultaneously via the two hands without
interference in the spatial patterns, whether the presented shapes
are the same or different (Franz et al., 1996; Franz, 2003); in com-
parison, controls with intact brains cannot draw two different
shapes simultaneously without considerable spatial interference
known as spatial coupling (Franz et al., 1991; Franz, 1997; Franz
and Ramachandran, 1998) and substantial increases in reaction
times (Franz et al., 1996; Franz, 2003) in comparison to when
drawing identical shapes. Those findings have led to the inference
that spatial coupling, an abstract form of planning, relies on an
intact corpus callosum. The findings also make clear that the two
hemispheres have some capacity to attend and respond in parallel
and virtually separately from one another when the brain is “split,”
particularly on a task with high ideomotor compatibility between
stimuli and responses such as copying shapes. In a similar vein,
the original studies by Gazzaniga and Sperry (1966) demonstrated
that people with commissurotomy could perform a reaction time
task with the right hand responding to a green-red color discrim-
ination to visual stimuli lateralized to the left hemisphere while
at the same time performing a reaction time task with the left
hand responding to light-dark discriminations to visual stimuli
presented to the right hemisphere, with each hand responding by
pressing one of two buttons located in pairs on a vertically posi-
tioned screen in front of the body. Unlike the control participants
who took approximately 40% longer to respond on the dual-task
compared to the single task trials, people with commissurotomy
took approximately the same amount of time to respond on both
conditions (Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1966), further supporting the
conclusion that with commissurotomy the two hemispheres can
respond in parallel to different tasks when the tasks are relatively
simple.
There is also evidence that on some level, the two sides of the
brain work together, as is shown by a slightly modified version of
the same task used in Franz et al. (1996). When the commissuro-
tomy patients were instructed to draw continuous lines (drawing
in a repeated back-and-forth or left-right manner either horizon-
tally or vertically along a flat surface) following visually lateralized
presentation of just a single line, they still produced no obvious
spatial disruptions (i.e., lack of spatial coupling) yet their hands
moved together in a coordinated manner in producing recipro-
cal cycles of lines even without explicit instructions to do so (and
without specific timing demands). Thus, the onset of movements
tended to be synchronous for the two hands despite the spatial
uncoupling, suggesting a role of subcortical processes (those unaf-
fected by commissurotomy) in unifying the coordination of the
hands (Franz et al., 1996). This provided an additional hint about
unifying constraints in general, which in my definition results in
a condensing of information during processing, due to a general
propensity of the brain to “bring together” different components
of movements, perceptions, and thoughts into coherent wholes,
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rather than to process components as separate entities, in the
interest of an economy of processing (Franz, 2010; Franz and
McCormick, 2010).
Other important evidence can be brought to bear on the uni-
fication of attention. An earlier study by Kreuter et al. (1972)
used rapid finger tapping of the index fingers during 10-s trials
to probe mental processes in the two hemispheres in five people
with commissurotomy and four controls. The study reported pre-
dominantly bimanual simultaneous tapping, although there were
some departures from synchrony. Perhaps the most provocative
findings occurred on conditions in which participants attempted
to tap with the two hands synchronously while also reciting the
alphabet or performing numerical calculations under different
conditions of task difficulty (and due to various reasons only a
small subsample could be tested on those dual-tasks). Whereas
control participants demonstrated no disruptions in rhythm of
the tapping movements and no errors on the dual-task situa-
tions, marked disruptions were shown in the tapping of at least
one commissurotomy participant in dual-task situations involv-
ing an alphabet task of skipping alternate letters, in which her
right hand or both hands actually stopped tapping during pauses
in her thinking. Even more difficult tasks (i.e., attempting to recite
the alphabet backward while tapping) could not be performed
at all, nor could tapping be performed while doing calculations,
with her right hand more severely affected than her left (although
both were affected to some extent). Remarkably, however, the
participant with commissurotomy continued to tap with her left
hand during some spontaneous conversation, although her right
hand didn’t move while she spoke (Kreuter et al., 1972). Whereas
two other participants with commissurotomy were unable to be
tested on the dual-tasks due to some complications in applying the
methods, one other participant with commissurotomy was able to
perform the dual-tasks except for some small disruptions in tap-
ping of the left hand while performing a verbal task. Notably, the
authors suggested that interference effects were minimal in con-
trols due to the highly automatic nature of tapping which tends
not to pose additional loads on attention processes, however, when
using motor tasks which involve more focused attention, such as
balancing a dowel rod, there tends to be disruptions in the motor
task under similar dual-task conditions (Kinsbourne and Cook,
1971). Together, the foregoing evidence leads to the following sum-
marized points: (1) allocation of focused attention is flexible, and
demands on focused attention change with learning (Kreuter et al.,
1972), (2) there is some capacity for focused attention in the two
hemispheres simultaneously even when they are disconnected due
to commissurotomy, at least for tasks with somewhat low demands
(Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1966; Franz et al., 1996), and (3) focused
attention is limited in capacity (Kreuter et al., 1972) and ultimately
is unified (i.e., normally shared) in the two hemispheres combined.
In the proposed framework, focused attention is flexibly allo-
cated (Franz, 2004a) and unifying constraints operate in the inter-
est of attention-for-action, so that focused attention depends on
operations of the basal ganglia-thalamic networks that form cir-
cuits with vast regions of the cortex, and activation of specific
cortical areas depends on the nature of the information, task,
and situation. Because of the adaptive nature of the attention
system, with increasing levels of learning (which requires focused
attention), expertise is achieved, and this essentially changes the
allocation of attention within the (dynamic) system.
Consider for illustrative purposes, a skilled musician’s remark-
able ability to produce smooth melodies despite playing different
rhythms with the two hands, as in the case of pianists. Pro-
ducing two different rhythms simultaneously is something most
unskilled novices cannot do, which suggests that they cannot suc-
cessfully divide attention between the two hands, and/or that the
attention required to produce two different rhythms exceeds the
limited capacity available. But with practice, aspects of the tasks
become more automatic in that less focused attention is needed.
Thus, expertise brings about an increased ability to focus on high
level representations such as the melody, replacing the earlier
(less-learned) focus on lower level sensorimotor (or elemental)
representations making up the individual rhythms (Franz, 2004a).
This implicates the interplay of attention, not only between the
left and right sides of the brain, but also among the different
conceptualized levels of the sensorimotor system (in Hughlings
Jackson’s (1884) terminology), again supporting “the organism’s
natural tendency to optimize actions and economize resources”
(Franz and McCormick, 2010 p. 273–274; see also Franz, 2010;
Franz et al., 2001).
INFLUENCES OF RESPONSE DEPENDENCIES ON
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
Maintaining unified attention and coherent behavior despite sep-
aration of the two cerebral hemispheres seems at first thought
impossible. But some critical clues from the early literature pro-
vide further insights. Teng and Sperry (1973) tested 6 people with
commissurotomy using lateralized visual presentations or letters
or digits to one or both visual fields, requiring manual responses in
which a hand would select a match from a group of possible letters
or digits shown in free vision on physical tiles, or verbal responses
in which participants said what they saw. Despite some confus-
ing aspects of the results which implicated the right hemisphere in
speech output (which in my view cannot be firmly concluded from
the data due to various task constraints and response measures),
some key findings are highly relevant to the present arguments.
In particular, Teng and Sperry (1973) reported evidence of extinc-
tion by the right hemisphere during tasks using bilateral stimulus
presentation (in all but one participant with commissurotomy),
consistent with some evidence in Kreuter et al. (1972) described
above, again illustrating a response dependency. Moreover, accord-
ing to Teng and Sperry (1973) other experiments revealed that even
when presenting stimuli to the right hemisphere 20 ms ahead of
the left hemisphere, or forcing participants to respond to the stim-
ulus in the right hemisphere first, such extinction persisted. The
authors also pointed out that when presented with other types of
stimuli, such as pictures or spatially aligned letters in a row across
midline (as opposed to single letters), there was less evidence of
extinction in the right hemisphere, although some evidence of
continuous suppression of the right hemisphere has also been
shown (Teng and Sperry, 1973).
According to Kreuter et al. (1972) one hemisphere appears
to withdraw attention from the task it governs when the other
hemisphere has increasing demands due to task difficulty, in line
with their key finding that the tapping of one or both hands is
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arrested during increasingly difficult levels of the dual task. This
suggests that when demands exceed supply, the brain’s response
is not only to reduce attention to some tasks, but even to remove
it entirely. Thus, the response dependency which results in one
hemisphere becoming arbiter at the expense of attention in the
other hemisphere depends to some extent on the specific nature
of the responses –speech is dominant in this case. Indeed, Kreuter
et al. (1972; p. 460) added that “. . .in normal life the corpus callo-
sum, in addition to its well established information transmitting
role, must also have an attention equilibratory function.”
But, there also must be a contribution of subcortical processes
in the case of response dependencies; otherwise one would not find
strong evidence of such dependencies in people with commissuro-
tomy. For example, Franz (2000; reviewed in Franz, 2003) tested
participants with commissurotomy or callosal agenesis (those
born without a corpus callosum) using auditory (therefore bilat-
eral) verbal instructions to “draw continuous circles with both
hands at a comfortable pace” but with no further instructions
as to how to coordinate the hands (Franz et al., 2002). Interest-
ingly, whereas in the commissurotomy participants the right hand
tended to lead the left in a coordinated manner and participants
adopted a mirror-symmetrical mode of drawing similar to what we
find in right-handed neurologically normal controls, participants
with callosal agenesis tended to draw with the left hand leading the
right in a coordinated manner but with both hands moving in the
same direction in space. While the reasons underlying a dissoci-
ation between groups are debated (Franz, 2003) most relevant to
the present context is the evidence of left hemisphere dominance
in the commissurotomy group (right hand lead) and right hemi-
sphere dominance in the callosal agenesis group (left hand lead)
on those tasks. I would argue that exertion of hemisphere domi-
nance assists in maintaining unity between the hemispheres and
this response dependency relies largely on available subcortical
processes.
Hemisphere dominance might bring about coherent behav-
ior (rather than a competition between hemispheres) due to
one hemisphere becoming the arbiter or leader, although it is
also possible that a rapid switch of attention occurs between
the hemispheres. However, in some circumstances a switching
model might be less likely to hold. For example, switching is
inconsistent with the observed phase differences between hands
on the circle-drawing task (Franz, 2003) and might be viewed
as counterproductive in terms of economy of processing (Franz
and McCormick, 2010), particularly given the wealth of litera-
ture demonstrating high costs in rapid switching between tasks
even in neurologically normal participants (Hayes et al., 1998;
Shook et al., 2005; Franz, 2006) although those studies did not
employ specific interhemispheric manipulations. We have argued
that the task, situation, and hemisphere specializations determine
which hemisphere is dominant at the time (Franz, 2004a, 2010)
and as the evidence suggests, such dominance can be exerted in a
prolonged manner in neurologically normal controls and in peo-
ple with commissurotomy (Franz, 2000, 2003). This leads to the
inference that such dominance is flexible to some degree, as is
focused attention (Franz, 2004a,b). Consider again a skilled musi-
cian. Imagine having a discussion with her. Her left hemisphere is
likely to be dominant in the task of speaking. But, ask the same
musician whether she enjoys a particular melody. It is likely to be
her right hemisphere that becomes dominant when she engages
in enjoyment of the music. As illustrated above, evidence suggests
that in people without a corpus callosum (and perhaps also with-
out anterior and posterior commissures, as in commissurotomy)
one hemisphere also assumes dominance depending on the task
and situation, at least under normal (bilateral) conditions of infor-
mational input. In this manner, flexible allocation of attention and
certain response dependencies (such as hemisphere dominance)
might be related, as they both implicate subcortical processes.
Response dependencies come in many forms and deserve fur-
ther study to fully understand. Just as those related to hemispheric
specializations in which a particular response mode is all that is
available, the cognitive set elicited by instructions in an experiment
can result in response tendencies which limit the information that
is attentively processed. Consider the brilliant demonstrations of
inattentional blindness (Neisser, 1979; Simons and Chabris, 1999).
Simons and Chabris (1999) instructed observers to watch video-
tapes of two teams of players moving around and bouncing and
passing an orange basketball, with one team wearing white shirts
and the other wearing black. The observers were told to keep a
silent count of the total number of passes, or number of bounces
(depending on condition) made by one team (white or black) and
to later write down their counts. In one of the experimental con-
ditions, after about 44 s of the task a woman was presented (in
the same videotape among the players) wearing a full gorilla cos-
tume, walking through the action arena and taking about 5 s to
do so, while the players in the action continued to play. Interest-
ingly, nearly 50% of participants reportedly failed to notice the
gorilla upon later interview, leading Simons and Chabris (1999)
to conclude that conscious perception does not occur without
focused attention. In the present view, response dependencies (in
this case, due to a compliance with instructions) largely determine
which information becomes part of attentive processing and also
what becomes a conscious experience. Thus, response dependen-
cies reflect a large category ranging from in-built constraints such
as hemisphere dominance, to learned influences which are elicited
through experimental instructions. The foregoing evidence sug-
gests that response dependencies operate in the neurologically
normal brain and are further illuminated by behavior in the split-
brain, pointing to subcortical processes as being essential in their
regulation. Subcortical processes are also fitting in maintaining
unity of what otherwise would be a bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1976).
HEMISPHERIC COMPETITION
The above examples suggest that it is possible for subcortical
processes to maintain unity through response dependencies even
in a brain with lateralized response networks. However, the precise
interplay between interhemispheric (commissural) processes and
circuits involving subcortical processes has not been defined, even
in the normal brain (nor is the present paper an attempt to do
so). However, one form of cortical constraint might be worthy of
further mention. A proposal from early studies of Gazzaniga and
Sperry (1966) was that“the neocortical commissures serve to unify
the visual world. . . and their presence tends to prevent the two half
brains from making discordant volitional decisions” (p. 261). The
latter portion of the above statement resonates well with recent
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convergent evidence that rudimentary callosal processes operate
in the interest of preventing conflicting manual response from
occurring between the two hemispheres of the brain (Shen and
Franz, 2005; Franz and Fahey, 2007). Those proposed rudimentary
callosal processes are not present in people born without a corpus
callosum and children of normal development who are younger
than age 6 years due to incomplete myelination (Franz and Fahey,
2007). Moreover, if such signals were removed in the mature brain,
as in the case of commissurotomy, it would be expected that
some antagonistic movements (conflicting movements between
the hemispheres) might occur at least occasionally. Indeed, Sperry
(1966) described a person with commissurotomy who was pulling
up trousers with one hand while pulling them down with the other.
In my own experience, I have observed one person with very recent
commissurotomy attempting to zip a sweater with one hand while
her other hand interrupted with a somewhat explosive impulse in
the other direction (the unzipping direction), consistent with our
earlier proposal (Franz and Fahey, 2007). However, with response-
dependent hemisphere dominance, such antagonistic movements
would be far less likely to occur, particularly if callosally mediated
signals inform one hemisphere that a response is pending in the
other (as is proposed to occur in the normal brain).
So far, the evidence described herein has implicated subcortical
mechanisms in the flexible allocation of attention in relation to a
range of response dependencies, and also in possible unification
of actions involving effector systems on the two sides of the body.
The remainder of this review attempts to further describe subcor-
tical processes as being crucial building blocks in a system which
allocates attention for action, particularly during learning. That
system is proposed to interact with response dependencies while
also being shaped by unifying constraints which are ubiquitous at
all levels of this highly complex and adaptive system.
THE FORMATION, ACTIVATION, AND SELECTION OF
ACTION-EFFECTS PERCEPTUAL CODES IN THE PROPOSED
MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK
It is critical to point out, that, whereas we can focus attention
to sensory effects, most motor movements themselves are not
the focus of attention. This brings us very close to the ideas of
Bernhard Hommel who has also argued that “attention is a direct
derivative of mechanisms subserving the control of basic motor
actions” and “perceiving and acting is thus the same process,
consisting of moving one’s body in order to generate particular
perceptions” which further suggests that “there is no qualitative
difference between the representation of a stimulus event (which
includes the action that has given rise to it) and the representation
of an action plan (. . . the action goal, that is”; Hommel, 2010, p.
123–124). Thus, it is the action-effects perceptual codes which are
likely to be represented in the brain, and this allows for a rever-
sal of the typical stimulus-to-response unidirectional framework
of earlier cognitive models to one in which a sensory (effects)-to
action perceptual code might underlie goal-directed actions.
Let us again consider some earlier evidence from studies in peo-
ple with commissurotomy. Holtzman and colleagues reported that
such participants maintained an ability to use visual information
presented to one hemisphere in predicting the location of a visual
cue subsequently presented to the other hemisphere, as though
one hemisphere directs attention to the other. However, when the
cues in the two hemispheres conflicted, there was actually a cost (in
reaction time) to respond to a subsequent cue in the other hemi-
sphere (Holtzman et al., 1981, 1984). To further examine this, Luck
et al. (1994) presented unilateral or bilateral displays of visual stim-
uli consisting of a target item and surrounding distracters with the
hypothesis that search time in a bilateral search task should be less
than in a unilateral search task (by approximately half) if searching
can occur in both hemispheres simultaneously, a hypothesis that
would appear at odds with the findings of Holtzman et al. (1981,
1984). Whereas Luck et al. (1994) found that search time increased
with set size as would be expected, the commissurotomy patients
produced far faster bilateral compared to unilateral search times,
approaching the “double time” prediction of searching bilateral
arrays. This was not the case in controls whose search times were
similar in unilateral and bilateral conditions. The findings from
the patients are in line with a model of dividing attention between
the perceptual tasks undertaken in the two hemispheres (without
reaching a capacity limit in either) and point to the corpus callo-
sum in unifying attention between the hemispheres in the normal
brain. Thus, at first glance the findings appear inconsistent across
lab groups in terms of whether or not the two hemispheres appear
to be able to divide attention on visual tasks. However, this is not
necessarily the case on reanalysis. The task of Holtzman and col-
leagues involves directed attention to sensory cues, which highlights
a focused attention process. In contrast, the visual search tasks of
Luck et al. (1994) highlight a process of discriminating a target
from a number of surrounding distracters, something that does
not necessarily require focused attention but instead, a process
of monitoring effects in the environment so that attention can
essentially capture the sensory effects which are relevant for fur-
ther processing, and notably, the actual response characteristics
(response time and accuracy) revealed superiority in the controls
(Luck et al., 1994).
The process of “capture” described above is proposed herein
as initiating the formation of action-effects codes through asso-
ciation (another rudimentary process). To illustrate further, let
us consider a more common example: when a young child first
reaches for the television remote and attempts to randomly press
its buttons, a salient and novel sensory event will eventually occur –
the TV turns on! The child then continues with his button pressing
behavior and eventually the event occurs again. With repeated
playful (trial-and-error) behavior the child begins to learn that
the sensory event (the TV turning on) is associated with his
button pressing behavior (action), thereby forming an action-
effects perceptual code which, once learned, can be later activated.
This process underlying the formation of action-effects perceptual
codes illustrates Level 1 of the proposed framework. We have sug-
gested that this process is linked to dopaminergic signaling of the
basal ganglia system, an idea which has perhaps received the most
thorough treatment in the PhD dissertation of Jeffrey Bednark
(2012) conducted in my lab and has gained some initial support
from earlier animal models (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006) and our
recent joint investigations in humans (Bednark, 2012; Bednark
et al., 2012).
The basal ganglia are a subcortical complex of nuclei best
known for their involvement in Parkinson’s disease which results
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in severe loss of the key neurotransmitter dopamine within the
substantia nigra pars compacta where it is produced, and also
in all areas of the brain that receive dopaminergic projections.
Involvement of basal ganglia has been implicated in attentive
as well as pre-attentive processes (Troscianko and Calvert, 1993;
Horowitz et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 1998; Franz and Miller, 2002),
and the proposed Level 1 is essentially on the border of those, with
salience and novelty of sensory effects capturing the attention of
the observer/actor/agent so that additional focused attention can
be applied (in order to form an action-effects perceptual code).
Discovering contingencies between sensory effects and the
movements that elicit them has been discussed in the context
of ideomotor learning with the notion that movements are ini-
tially carried out in a predominantly exploratory manner but with
the aid of mechanisms such as those underlying the orienting
response (Sokolov, 1963) in forming action-effects codes (Elsner
and Hommel, 2001, 2004; Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Bednark,
2012). However, a difference in theoretical approach is that ideas
underlying ideomotor theory correspond to intentional perfor-
mance and not more generally the components of an adaptive sys-
tem of learning which optimizes behavior to salient changes in the
environment as in the proposed approach (Franz and McCormick,
2010; Bednark, 2012; Bednark et al., 2012). Extensively studied
(although perhaps not in the context of focused attention), the
basal ganglia-dopaminergic system forms the basis of numerous
highly cited reviews which capture the elegant parallel loop orga-
nization of the basal ganglia (striatal)-thalamo-cortical circuits
(Alexander et al., 1986) and the manner in which dopaminergic
activity modulates synaptic activity intrinsic to the basal gan-
glia (Bjorklund and Dunnett, 2007) through phasic and tonic
signals (Mink, 1996). Those processes are thought to be partic-
ularly important in detection of salient sensory signals (perhaps
using a superior colliculus input: Comoli et al., 2003; Redgrave
and Gurney, 2006) which are often unexpected and in association
with rewards (Schultz, 1998). Specifically, the sensory effects are
thought to elicit a dopaminergic neuronal response which leads to
phasic activity in the striatum of the basal ganglia (Freeman et al.,
1985; Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Bednark, 2012). The pro-
posed Level 1 depends on dopamine input to bind action-effects
codes during their initial formation, characterizing a rudimentary
learning mechanism and (based on the proposed framework) also
a basis on which the development of endogenous focused atten-
tion evolved (as Levels 2 and 3). This rudimentary system (Level
1) is conceptualized as one that likely interacts with other sub-
cortical structures including (but not limited to) the cerebellum
and hippocampus through cortical loci and with emotion systems
through limbic inputs, making up a highly adaptive system of
learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009;
Ashby et al., 2010). Learning occurs at all levels of the proposed
framework in increasingly higher degrees of complexity with level
of involvement. Thus, Level 1 reflects rudimentary processes of
learning upon which Level 2 (and further, Level 3) evolved, and
development is proposed to follow a similar trajectory with lower
levels becoming embedded into increasingly higher (and more
complex) levels in a manner akin to that proposed by Hughlings
Jackson (1884); Franz and McCormick, 2010; Franz and Gillett,
2011).
Once the action-effects codes are learned, they must be stored,
and this likely involves redundant storage areas of the brain
(cerebellum, striatum of the basal ganglia, hippocampus, and cor-
tex). Evidence has shown that both the cerebellum and basal
ganglia contain maps of the body (Hoover and Strick, 1999),
which is consistent with storage of lower level codes, and corti-
cal networks are likely to be involved in higher level storage as
well. The key processes of activation and inhibition proposed to
occur initially in Level 2 (but also in higher levels) are also thought
to be the basis of sequencing and switching of perceptual codes
which can be described as involving associative processes built
upon rudimentary functions of Level 1 (see Figure 1).
Supporting the activation-inhibition processes of Level 2, is
a basic model in which the intrinsic circuits of the basal gan-
glia result in the activation of desired actions and inhibition of
competing and prepotent actions (Mink, 1996; Franz, 2006). This
model derives from the classic model of Parkinson’s disease in
which the hallmark symptoms (e.g., tremor, dyskinesia, akinesia)
are proposed to be due to an imbalance of the direct and indirect
circuits which comprise the primary architecture of the basal gan-
glia system, with such a balance contributing to aggregate effects
of disinhibition on the thalamic nuclei that receive basal ganglia
output to enable for desired motor responses without interfer-
ing effects of irrelevant or undesired prepotent responses (Mink,
1996; Franz, 2006). Evidence consistent with this model comes
from experimentation on simple responses (Franz and Miller,
2002) and other motor and cognitive processes (Hayes et al., 1998;
Shook et al., 2005; Franz, 2006) in people with Parkinson’s dis-
ease. For example, Franz and Miller (2002) tested people with
Parkinson’s disease and controls matched for a number of demo-
graphic parameters on simple responses using manipulated levels
of response readiness (Franz and Miller, 2002). A color pre-cue
indicated that a Go signal would follow on 80% of trials (high
readiness), and a different color pre-cue indicated that a Go signal
would follow on only 20% of trials (low readiness), with No-Go
signals on the remaining trials in each case. Results revealed that
whereas the same patterns occurred in the two groups in terms
of the influence of response readiness on reaction time (RT; i.e.,
higher levels of response readiness leading to faster RTs compared
to low levels of response readiness), this consistent pattern across
groups was not found for the force impulse which was modulated
with level of response readiness in controls but not in people with
Parkinson’s disease. This led to the interpretation that there is a
basic impairment in processes related to conversion of levels of
response readiness to appropriate activation of responses (Franz
and Miller, 2002). Interestingly, Sperry (1952, p. 302) alluded to
something similar in his earlier suggestion that the function of
perception might be “an implicit preparation to respond. . . to pre-
pare the organism for adaptive action.”Other evidence from Franz
and Miller (2002) revealed impairments related to inhibition, with
inappropriate levels of force occurring in people with Parkinson’s
disease, for example, in the hand that was not supposed to respond
on a trial, which seems to be the flip-side of activation, fitting well
with the framework of Mink (1996) in which the direct circuit
increases activation whereas the indirect circuit increases activity
in the opposite direction (inhibition). Thus, the proposed Level 2
of the framework described herein is characterized by rudimentary
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processes of activation and inhibition of action-effects perceptual
codes ranging from elemental ones (as in the case of Franz and
Miller, 2002), to those making up perceptual sets (Shook et al.,
2005) and other more complex associations (Franz, 2006). Acti-
vation and inhibition processes built upon those attributed to
Level 2 are further elaborated at Level 3 which involves increas-
ing cortical influences that are part of the highly evolved basal
ganglia-thalamic-cortical circuits and the involvement of cortical
networks depending on the specific nature of the information.
Moreover, thalamic feedback loops with the striatum (the input
nucleus of the basal ganglia) have more recently been suggested as
modifying the classical model of direct and indirect circuits (that of
Mink, 1996), suggesting a more elaborated model (McFarland and
Haber, 2000). Furthermore, as suggested above, the rudimentary
processes of association, activation, and inhibition as proposed
in Levels 1 and 2 are also involved (perhaps in elaborated and
higher levels of processing) in tasks such as sequence learning
(e.g., pre-SMA: Sakai et al., 1999), and task switching (particularly
implicating prefrontal regions in addition to the basal ganglia:
Benecke et al., 1987; Hayes et al., 1998; Cools et al., 2001; Shook
et al., 2005).
It is herein proposed that with learning, focused attention
essentially shifts from the elemental components (basic action-
effects perceptual codes) to higher-order codes associated with
sequences or chunks, and in the interest of efficiency, perceptual
codes no longer adaptive are replaced with those that are, with a
highly flexible allocation of attention. Moreover, perceptual codes
for highly automatized routines require less focused attention to
activate than would a series of codes associate with more elemental
movements. The flexible allocation of this proposed system there-
fore depends on many factors related to the task demands and
situation (bottom-up and top-down), but also on response depen-
dencies and unifying constraints (such as those earlier described).
In this manner, the so-called hierarchy of goals (and subgoals) of
Cooper and Shallice (2006) is captured primarily in Level 3 which
serves to alter the organization and content of stored action-effects
perceptual codes. Level 3 also incorporates processes of learning
in which goal-directed actions become habits (Ashby et al., 2010),
reflecting the proposed “automaticity loop” (upper right corner of
Figure 1). Thus, the fundamental functions of capture and associ-
ation (from Level 1), and activation and inhibition (from Level 2)
are further incorporated into higher-order levels of action-effects
perceptual codes (e.g., Level 3), due to the propensity for unifying
representations at all levels of the highly adaptive system (Franz
and McCormick, 2010).
As pointed out earlier, research in the normal brain suggests that
the two hemispheres usually tend to work together to produce a
common goal or conceptually unified action or thought (Franz
et al., 2001; Franz, 2010; Franz and McCormick, 2010). Thus, the
goal-relatedness of a sequence of perceptual codes must also be
learned, and this often occurs with very high levels of cognition
such as that involved in language (Franz and McCormick, 2010),
with further processes of learning serving to alter the hierarchical
organization of the perceptual codes (Cooper and Shallice, 2006).
One might speculate (as we did), that the intact corpus callosum
would be highly necessary for the learning of goal-directed actions,
particularly those involving both sides of the body (e.g., biman-
ual) and/or the binding of movement sequences with speech-word
labels. Franz et al. (2000) provides strong experimental support of
this prediction. People with commissurotomy were asked to wear
a blindfold (to prevent input from going to both hemispheres
via the visual modality) and to pantomime actions of the hands
in response to experimentally manipulated verbal commands in
the form of unimanual actions like “grab an orange” or biman-
ual actions like “peel an orange.” The trials of key interest were
the bimanual ones in cases of novel or familiar actions. Results
revealed that if the actions were novel in that they were never
before performed by the participant, the pantomimed gestures
appeared as mere random movements that did not resemble the
“commanded” actions in any way. It was only when the actions
were well-learned prior to commissurotomy that the participants
could pantomime them relatively accurately (and note that the ver-
bal command was available to both cerebral hemispheres which
are both capable of understanding verbal descriptions; Franz
et al., 2000). An intriguing (albeit modest) dissociation is that one
commissurotomy participant who frequently went fishing could
pantomime the action of “putting a hook on a line” although he
could not pantomime the similar motor procedures involved in
the action of “threading a needle,” claiming “I don’t sew!” To the
converse, a second commissurotomy participant was easily able
to pantomime the action of “threading a needle” when asked to,
but could not “put a hook on a line” stating clearly “I have never
fished!” One might infer that the elemental response codes of the
actions would be similar in the two cases even though their verbal
labels are different. Indeed, the well-learned elemental movement
sequences were intact and could be retrieved somewhat automat-
ically (reflecting successful learning based on Level 2 processes).
However, those actions that had never been learned (i.e., novel
actions) could not be performed upon verbal command. Those
are proposed to depend on Level 3 for the high levels of learn-
ing required in the formation of complex action-effects codes in
which the (verbal/speech) goals are also bound to the pantomimed
actions. Findings of Franz et al. (2000) also support the frame-
work that higher elaborated levels of the sensorimotor system
(those related to representations of goal-directed actions) override
and/or inhibit lower sensorimotor networks, a property of Level 3
which assists in modulating lower level systems and enabling the
two hands to work cooperatively to achieve a common goal (Franz
and McCormick, 2010). Notably, the well-learned actions were
still readily retrievable in the participants with commissurotomy
(Level 3) again pointing to subcortical processes as being integral
(Franz et al., 2000); although as alluded to earlier, it is outside of
the present framework to describe precisely where and how those
codes are stored. As described above, focused attention is concep-
tualized as being flexibly allocated in accordance with the level of
network involvement such that activation of high level networks
is virtually synonymous with attention to high level action-effects
codes (which also contain the verbal codes corresponding to goals).
The flexible allocation of attention to goals within a hierarchical
representation also seems consistent with the Action Identification
Theory of Vallacher and Wegner (1989) in research on individual
differences and personality.
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According to the proposed account, in learning of complex
actions our brains resort to the most economical form of action
guidance, and that is to be aware of (conscious of) the high
level action goals (i.e., threading a needle), while (with learning)
becoming less aware of (conscious of) the details of the procedures
to achieve the action goal (i.e., moving one hand upward to hold
the needle while moving the other hand horizontally to thread
it). Through learning, our focused attention essentially moves to
different networks of processing from those that were initially
involved in first learning the elemental movements. Thus, our
action goals involve processing (or attention) at higher-order net-
works, and the precise movement procedures are unattended once
actions are learned (Franz, 2010; Franz and McCormick, 2010). We
can easily confirm this basic model by asking ourselves after the
fact of learning – “what did I just do?” The answer – “I threaded a
needle.” The elemental responses used in that well-learned action
are not what we tend to recall unless specifically asked to, and even
then, it takes quite a lot of effortful and imagery-laden processing
to do so.
DISTINGUISHING BILATERAL PROJECTIONS OF SENSORY
AND MOTOR INPUT-OUTPUT SYSTEMS FROM THE
SUBCORTICAL SYSTEM PROPOSED HEREIN
Gazzaniga and Sperry (1967) noted that “The disruption of inter-
hemispheric integration produces remarkably little disturbance
in ordinary daily behavior, temperament, or intellect. The func-
tional deficits tend to be compensated by the development of
bilateral motor control from each hemisphere, also by bilateral-
ity in some of the sensory projection pathways and by a variety
of other unifying factors that we deliberately avoid or exclude
so far as possible in the testing procedures” (p. 131–132). The
upper distal extremities (and the speech system) are usually
referred to in association with lateralized control, in comparison
to the proximal extremities (bilateral control). Sperry also pointed
out other bilateral projections which include the cutaneous sen-
sory system for the face which is mediated by the trigeminal
nerves for each side represented in both hemispheres. As already
stated, audition is also bilateral. So are systems mediating crude
pain, temperature, pressure, and position sense, especially from
axial parts of the body, and exploratory movements of the eyes
can provide bilateral representation of a scene (Sperry, 1986).
Mental-emotional ambiance or semantic surround in self and
social awareness also spreads quickly to both hemispheres (Sperry,
1986).
Decades ago Sperry also noted“The extrapyramidal motor out-
flow from the cerebral cortex likewise arises from associative and
sensory cortical fields as well as from those traditionally designated
as motor. Excitation patterns in the sensory and associative areas,
therefore, have to integrate with patterns in the subcortical motor
systems as well as with those in neighboring motor fields” (Sperry,
1952, p. 300). It is these which in my view implicate the subcorti-
cal processes I am referring to as comprising the basic components
of the allocation of attention system. Furthermore, unifying con-
straints are conceptualized as operating in a ubiquitous manner at
all levels of the system, primarily by reducing processing demands,
and their associated networks are highly plastic, i.e., they change
with learning. In contrast, bilateral projections are hardwired
although they are modified through developmental processes such
as myelination (Paus et al., 1999) and synapse and/or axonal elim-
ination (Purves and Lichtman, 1980; for reviews see Blakemore
and Choudhury, 2006; Turney and Lichtman, 2012).
The proposed account (of a basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical sys-
tem) underlying the system of allocation of attention is intended
to apply for a vast range of actions which include multi effector
and bimanual actions (in addition to unimanual actions). Thus,
in the case of actions employing effectors controlled by two differ-
ent hemispheres, although learning of new actions (in association
with high level codes) cannot occur without the corpus callosum,
learning at lower levels of the system together with the capability
to retrieve well-learned action-effects codes, would still be possi-
ble (Franz et al., 2000). Evidence from animal and human studies
reviewed recently in Brun et al. (2012) including findings of their
own, reveals that unilateral manipulations result in bilateral activ-
ity in the striatum (the primary input nucleus of the basal ganglia),
and other nuclei of the basal ganglia including the globus pallidus
externus (GPe), subthalamic nucleus (STN), and the globus pal-
lidus internus (GPi), a primary output nucleus of the basal ganglia.
Evidence reveals, for example, that high frequency stimulation to
the unilateral STN results in complex changes in bilateral basal
ganglia-thalamic-cortical networks. According to a study by Par-
ent et al. (1999), the GPi projection in primates reveals ipsilateral
and contralateral projections to the thalamus and brainstem, based
on the use of retrograde cell labeling techniques. In addition, as
alluded to earlier, evidence suggests that the classical model involv-
ing direct and indirect circuits (Mink, 1996) requires modification,
particularly on the basis of Parent and Parent (2002) who report a
high degree of axonal collateralization in the system, and McFar-
land and Haber (2000) who report not only that striatal output
projects to thalamic nuclei (the traditional model), but also, that
ventral thalamic nuclei relay input back to the dorsal striatum.
Furthermore, there appears to be a convergence of information
onto the dorsal striatum (Takada et al. (1998a,b)), which is con-
sistent with the notion of “unifying constraints” proposed herein
(although this is a loose analogy). Together, this evidence suggests
that the striatum of the basal ganglia is part of a complex and
widely distributed network that can influence other neural areas
in complex ways (including bilaterally), and the thalamus feeds
back information to the striatum, thereby further influencing that
system. However, as those researchers also state, it is not yet known
precisely how the basal ganglia circuitry influences neural activ-
ity bilaterally, nor which precise circuits are involved. The hope
(and prediction) is that future research will further elucidate the
precise bilateral projections involved. Interestingly also, the neu-
roanatomical findings reveal a hierarchical structure of the basal
ganglia system (references above), consistent to what is described
herein.
EVIDENCE OF VERY HIGH LEVEL CONSTRAINTS DERIVED
FROM OUR SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
We have learned from experimentation on the split-brain, that the
capacity for focused attention is limited although unified (Kreuter
et al., 1972) even though responses can be lateralized, although it
is not fully understood how unity of behavior occurs in a brain
with lateralized function. However, one other clue might be worth
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considering. A mechanism was earlier proposed in the interest of
alerting one hemisphere that a distal manual response is pending
in the other, and depends on the integrity of the primary cor-
tical commissure, the corpus callosum (Franz and Fahey, 2007).
However, unlike for the manual system there is no proposed alert-
ing mechanism for the speech system, and while the hands often
work together to satisfy a common goal with higher levels overrid-
ing lower levels of the system (Franz and McCormick, 2010) this
does not apply in the same way for speech. Furthermore, it would
be disastrous for unified behavior if two different speech outputs
occurred simultaneously in the different hemispheres! It appears
that a unique form of complementarity has evolved in facilitating
social interactions in humans. We speak to others, yet we also lis-
ten, observe, and sometimes even touch. We often perceive others’
expressions, intonations, and bodily movements while we speak. In
fact, very clever research studies have shown that our understand-
ing of speech is greatly facilitated by concurrent observations of
facial gestures of those we are conversing with (i.e., listening to),
a finding stemming from the so-called McGurk and MacDon-
ald (1976) effect (Baynes et al., 1994; Gentilucci and Cattaneo,
2005; Rosenblum, 2010). So many of the other functions which
have shown some lateralized hemisphere specializations seem to
be related in some way to this basic dichotomy of speech and facial
expression recognition. Evidence from studies using chimeric dis-
plays point to a right hemisphere superiority in facial emotion,
as do closely related functions such as those involved in process-
ing spatial relations of objects, geometric patterns, and various
other familiar or unfamiliar stimuli (Levy et al., 1972; Bourne,
2008). Additional evidence of this right hemisphere superior-
ity comes from part-whole and gestalt completion tests (Nebes,
1974), geometric tasks (Franco and Sperry, 1977), mental rotation
(Corballis and Sergeant, 1988), visuo-spatial construction (Sperry
et al., 1969), recognition of objects, scenes, and personally relevant
people (Sperry et al., 1979), and in general, processes associated
with appreciating communicative significance and emotional tone
(Sperry, 1977) of prosody and bodily postures (George et al., 1996;
Downing et al., 2001). In contrast, tasks which reflect forms of
symbolic processing such as numerical calculations, the ordering
and sequencing of events (which often are associated with speech;
Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1967; Kreuter et al., 1972), and reading and
writing (Sperry, 1977), all could be construed as stemming from
the basic function of speech. Thus, speech interactions which form
a dominant form of social interaction, might have led to a unique
form of unity in behavior comprised of a complementarity in
the division of labor of the two hemispheres. Evidence from the
“split-brain” clearly illustrates this unique form of complemen-
tarity which combines unifying constraints at a very high level
together with response dependencies.
UNIQUENESS OF THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK
The present framework proposes a multilevel system for the
allocation of attention for action, in which the dopaminergic
basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical circuits are integral. Although the
present framework shares some features with models in the litera-
ture (as pointed out above), it also reflects a number of unique
aspects. Notably, the present framework builds upon a highly
dynamic system in which subcortical processes are central to the
networks involved, therefore proposing a different, or perhaps,
complementary approach to localization models in which the
primary focus is cortical networks (particularly in the case of
sequencing, e.g., Keele et al., 2003). The present framework is based
on an embodied cognition view in which cognition evolved from
basic sensorimotor interactions with the environment, although
symbolic representations are thought to build upon those rudi-
mentary forms of representations (Franz and McCormick, 2010,
footnote 1). The present framework is based on an evolution-
ary model in which higher cortical processes evolved from rudi-
mentary functions of primarily subcortical systems, with further
evolution of increasingly higher levels, with the involved cortical
levels linked to the nature of information being processed. The
present framework also illuminates what is proposed to be the
basic processes (capture, association, activation, inhibition) on
which procedural learning is built, with the idea that sequenc-
ing and switching are elaborated forms of those rudimentary
processes, as might be “selection” when considering further influ-
ences of top-down processes. Furthermore, this framework defines
“representation” as the action-effects perceptual codes underlying
action learning and memory in general, further exemplifying an
embodied system. As pointed out above, the synthesis of experi-
mental evidence from cognitive studies, a neural model involving
the basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical system, and a framework of
allocation of attention to action, is original, to the author’s knowl-
edge. Although an attempt is made to point out relevant overlap
with existing models in the literature, space limitations prohibit
the inclusion of other very important and relevant research that
also bears on the topic of this paper. For example, specific find-
ings in the area of Parkinson’s disease are left for a companion
review.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The proposed account is summarized as follows: a highly evolved
system of attention allocation depends on the integrity of
subcortical-cortical circuits of which the basal ganglia complex
and thalamus are at the very heart; other subcortical networks
and structures outside of the scope of the present review are
undoubtedly involved but are not described in this paper. A highly
flexible system regulates a dynamic allocation of focused attention
to the formation, activation, inhibition, and selection of action-
effects perceptual codes which form a hierarchical organization
with increasingly higher levels reflecting learning. This proposed
system operates in the intact brain and the brain with commis-
surotomy. However, the “split-brain” does not have the normal
integration of spatial processes between the two cerebral hemi-
spheres, nor does it have the so-called manual alerting system
(described herein); furthermore, the mechanism proposed to assist
in equilibrating attention across the hemispheres (Kreuter et al.,
1972) might actually rely largely on the basal ganglia-thalamic-
cortical system described herein. Our social interactions, using
our most dominant response mode – that of speech – reveal a
primary response dependency which shapes our conscious expe-
rience by imposing limitations on the availability of information
to processing networks (i.e., the non-speech hemisphere in the
case of the “split-brain”). This type of response dependency also
illustrates a unique division of labor in which complementarity
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of functions in the two cerebral hemispheres evolved as a unifying
constraint at very high levels of the system, building on the propen-
sity of the brain to process information in a unified manner at all
levels of perception, thought, and action (Franz and McCormick,
2010).
In closing, it is perhaps important to again point out that
focused attention and conscious experience are not necessarily
the same thing according to careful analysis based on process-
ing of vision (Lamme, 2003). However, the present framework
suggests that what becomes part of conscious experience can be
strongly influenced by response dependencies and ultimately the
action-effects codes we attend to.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author gratefully appreciates funding from a Marsden Grant
awarded by the Royal Society of New Zealand, helpful discussions
with Rob Turner, and the insightful suggestions and comments
of Bernhard Hommel and other reviewers. The author further
wishes to acknowledge that this article had its publication costs
waived.
REFERENCES
Akelaitis, A. J. (1944). A study of gno-
sis, praxis and language following
section of the corpus callosum and
anterior commissure. J. Neurosurg. 1,
94–102.
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R.,
and Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel
organization of functionally segre-
gated circuits linking basal ganglia
and cortex. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 9,
357–381.
Ashby, F. G., Turner, B. O., and
Horvitz, J. C. (2010). Cortical
and basal ganglia contributions to
habit learning and automaticity.
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 14,
208–215.
Balleine, B. W., and O’Doherty, J. P.
(2009). Human and rodent homolo-
gies in action control: corticostriatal
determinants of goal-directed and
habitual action. Neuropsychophar-
macology 35, 48–69.
Baynes, K., Fummell, M., and Fowler,
C. (1994). Hemispheric contribu-
tions to the integration of visual
and auditory information in speech
perception. Percept. Psychophys. 55,
633–641.
Bednark, J. G. (2012). Establishing
Movement Heuristics for Voluntary
Action: Electrophysiological Corre-
lates of Movement-Outcome Learn-
ing and the Sense of Agency. Doctor
of Philosophy, University of Otago,
Dunedin.
Bednark, J., Reynolds, J., Stafford, T.,
Redgrave, P., and Franz, E. A. (2012).
Creating a movement heuristic for
voluntary action: electrophysiologi-
cal correlates of ideomotor learning.
Cortex (in press).
Benecke, R., Rothwell, J. C., Dick, J.
P. R., Day, B. L., and Marsden, C.
D. (1987). Disturbance of sequential
movements in people with Parkin-
son’s disease. Brain 110, 361–379.
Bjorklund, A., and Dunnett, S. B.
(2007). Dopamine neuron systems
in the brain: an update. Trends Neu-
rosci. 30, 194–202.
Blakemore, S.-J., and Choudhury,
S. (2006). Development of the
adolescent brain: implications for
executive function and social cogni-
tion. J. Child. Psychol. Psychiatry 47,
296–312.
Bourne, V. (2008). Chimeric faces,
visual field bias, and reaction time
bias: have we been missing a trick?
Laterality 13, 92–103.
Bridgman, C. S., and Smith, K. U.
(1945). Bilateral neural integration
in visual perception after section
of the corpus callosum. J. Comp.
Neurol. 83, 57–68.
Bruce, A. (1890). On the absence of the
corpus callosum in the human brain
with description of a new case. Brain
12, 171–190.
Brun, Y., Karachi, C., Fernandez-Vidal,
S., Jodoin, N., Grabli, D., Mallet, L.,
et al. (2012). Does unilateral basal
ganglia activity functionally influ-
ence the contralateral side? What we
can learn from STN stimulation in
patients with Parkinson’s disease. J.
Neurophysiol. 108, 1575–1583.
Comoli, E., Coizet, V., Boyes, J., Bolam,
J. P., Canteras, N. S., Quirk, R. H.,
et al. (2003). A direct projection
from superior colliculus to substan-
tianigra for detecting salient visual
events. Nat. Neurosci. 6, 974–980.
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J.,
and Robbins, T. W. (2001). Mech-
anisms of cognitive set flexibility
in Parkinson’s disease. Brain 124,
2503–2512.
Cooper, R. P., and Shallice, T. (2006).
Hierarchical schemas and goals in
the control of sequential behaviour.
Psychol. Rev. 113, 887–916.
Corballis, M. C., and Sergeant, J. (1988).
Imagery in a commissurotomized
patient. Neuropsychologia 26, 13–26.
Downing, P. E., Jiang, Y., Shuman, M.
and Kanwisher, N. (2001). A corti-
cal area selective for visual process-
ing of the human body. Science 293,
2470–2473.
Elsner, B., and Hommel, B. (2001).
Effect anticipation and action con-
trol. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 27, 229–240.
Elsner, B., and Hommel, B. (2004). Con-
tiguity and contingency in action-
effect learning. Psychol. Forsch. 68,
138–154.
Franco, L., and Sperry, R. W. (1977).
Hemispheric lateralization for cog-
nitive processing of geometry. Neu-
ropsychologia 15, 107–114.
Franz, E. A. (1997). Spatial coupling in
the coordination of complex actions.
Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 50A, 684–704.
Franz, E. A. (2000). “A double dissoci-
ation in the cerebral dominance of
bimanual control: callosotomy ver-
sus callosal agenesis,” in Biannual
Meeting of the Federation of European
Neurosciences (FENS), Brighton.
Franz, E. A. (2003). “Bimanual action
representation: a window to human
evolution,” in Taking Action: Cog-
nitive Neuroscience Perspectives on
the Problem of Intentional Acts, ed.
S. Johnston-Frey (Cambridge: MIT
Press), 259–288.
Franz, E. A. (2004a). On the perceptual
control of bimanual performance. J.
Mot. Behav. 36, 380–381.
Franz, E. A. (2004b). Attentional dis-
tribution of task parameters to the
two hands during bimanual perfor-
mance of right- and left-handers. J.
Mot. Behav. 36, 71–81.
Franz, E. A. (2006). “Converging evi-
dence of the basal ganglia’s role in
focused action selection and inhibi-
tion of competing information,” in
Recent Breakthroughs in Basal Gan-
glia Research, Chap. 18, ed. E. Bezard
(New York: Nova Books), 227–239.
Franz, E. A. (2010). A framework
for conceptual binding of biman-
ual actions: possible applications to
neurology and neuro-rehabilitative
therapies. Curr. Trends Neurol. 4,
1–22.
Franz, E. A., Eliassen, J., Ivry, R. B., and
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1996). Dissocia-
tion of spatial and temporal cou-
pling in the bimanual movements of
callosotomy patients. Psychol. Sci. 7,
306–310.
Franz, E. A., and Fahey, S. (2007).
Developmental change in inter-
hemispheric communication: evi-
dence from bimanual cost. Psychol.
Sci. 18, 1030–1031.
Franz, E. A., and Gillett, G. (2011).
John Hughlings Jackson’s evolution-
ary neurology: a unifying framework
for cognitive neuroscience. Brain
134, 3114–3120.
Franz, E. A., and McCormick, R. (2010).
Conceptual unifying constraints on
anticipatory bimanual control. Exp.
Brain Res. 205, 273–282.
Franz, E. A., and Miller, J. (2002). Effects
of response readiness on reaction
time and force output in people
with Parkinson’s Disease. Brain 125,
1733–1750.
Franz, E. A., and Ramachandran, V.
S. (. (1998)). Bimanual coupling in
amputees with phantom limbs. Nat.
Neurosci. 1, 443–444.
Franz, E. A., Waldie, K. E., and Smith,
M. (. (2000)). The effect of cal-
losotomy on novel versus familiar
bimanual actions: a neural dissoci-
ation between controlled and auto-
matic processes? Psychol. Sci. 11,
82–85.
Franz, E. A., Zelaznik, H. N., and
McCabe, G. (. (1991)). Spatial topo-
logical constraints in a bimanual
task. Acta Psychol. 77, 137–151.
Franz, E. A., Zelaznik, H. N., Swinnen,
S., and Walter,C. (2001). Spatial con-
ceptual influences on the coordina-
tion of bimanual actions: when a
dual task becomes a single task. J.
Mot. Behav. 33, 103–112.
Franz, E. A., Rowse, A., and Ballantine,
B. (2002). Does handedness deter-
mine what hand leads in a bimanual
task? J. Mot. Behav. 35, 411–413.
Freeman, A. S., Meltzer, L. T., and Bun-
ney, B. S. (1985). Firing properties
of substantianigra dopaminergic-
neurons in free moving rats. Life Sci.
36, 1983–1994.
Gazzaniga, M. S., Bogen, J. E., and
Sperry, R. W. (1962). Some func-
tional effects of sectioning the cere-
bral commissures in man. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. 48, 1765–1769.
Gazzaniga, M. S., Bogen, J. E., and
Sperry, R. W. (1963). Laterality
effects in somesthesis following cere-
bral commissurotomy in man. Neu-
ropsychologia 1, 209–215.
Gazzaniga, M. S., and Sperry, R. W.
(1965). Language in human patients
after brain bisection. Fed. Proc. 24,
522.
www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 535 | 13
Franz Attention for action
Gazzaniga, M. S., and Sperry, R.
W. (1966). Simultaneous double
discrimination response following
brain bisection. Psychonomic Science
4, 261–262.
Gazzaniga, M. S., and Sperry, R. W.
(1967). Language after section of
the cerebral commissures. Brain 90,
131–148.
Gentilucci, M., and Cattaneo, L. (2005).
Automatic audiovisual integration
in speech perception. Exp. Brain Res.
167, 66–75.
George, M. S., Parekh, P. I., Rosin-
sky, N., Ketter, T. A., Kimbrell, T.
A., Heilman, K. M., et al. (1996).
Understanding emotional prosody
activates right hemisphere regions.
Arch. Neurol. 53, 665–670.
Glickstein, M., and Sperry, R. W. (1959).
Contralateral transfer of somesthetic
discriminations in monkeys after
section of major hemispheric com-
missures. Am. Psychol. 14, 385.
Glickstein, M., and Sperry, R. W. (1960).
Intermanualsomesthetic transfer in
split-brain rhesus monkeys. J. Comp.
Physiol. Psychol. 53, 322–327.
Hayes, A. E., Davidson, M. C., Keele, S.
W. and Rafal, R. D. (1998). Toward a
functional analysis of the basal gan-
glia. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 10, 178–198.
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization
of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological
Theory. New York: Wiley.
Herwig, A., and Waszak, F. (2009).
Intention and attention in ideomo-
tor learning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 62,
219–227.
Holtzman, J. D., Sidtis, J. J., Volpe, B. T.,
Wilson, D. H., and Gazzaniga, M. S.
(1981). Dissociation of spatial infor-
mation for stimulus location and
the control of attention. Brain 104,
861–872.
Holtzman, J. D., Volpe, B. T., and
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1984). “Spatial
orientation following commissural
section,” in Varieties of Attention, eds
R. Parasuraman and D. R. Davies
(London: Academic Press), 375–394.
Hommel, B. (2010). “Grounding atten-
tion in action control: the inten-
tional control of selection,” in Effort-
less Attention: A New Perspective in
the Cognitive Science of Attention and
Action, ed. B. J. Bruya (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 121–140.
Hoover, J. E., and Strick, P. L. (1999).
The organization of cerebellar and
basal ganglig outputs to primary
motor cortex as revealed by ret-
rograde transneuronal transport of
Herpes simplex virus type 1. J. Neu-
rosci. 19, 1446–1463.
Horowitz, T. S., Choi, W. Y., Horvitz,
J. C., Cô. te, L. J., and Mangels, J.
A. (2006). Visual search deficits in
Parkinson’s disease are attenuated by
bottom-up target salience and top-
down information. Neuropsycholo-
gia 44, 1962–1977.
Horvitz, J. C., Stewart, T., and Jacobs,
B. L. (1997). Burst activity of ven-
tral segmental dopamine neurons is
elicited by sensory stimuli in the
awake cat. Brain Res. 759, 251–258.
Hughlings Jackson, J. (1884). On affec-
tations of speech from disease of
the brain (2). Br. Med. J. 12,
703–707.
James, W. (1890/1918). The Principles of
Psychology, Vol. 1 and 11. New York,
NY: Dover Publications, Inc.
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origin of Con-
sciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin/Mariner Books.
Keele, S. W., Mayr, U., Ivry, R., Hazel-
tine, E. and Heuer, H. (2003). The
cognitive and neural architecture
of sequence representation. Psychol.
Rev. 110, 316–339.
Kinsbourne, M., and Cook, J. (1971).
Generalized and lateralized effect of
concurrent verbalization on a uni-
manaul skill. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 23,
341–345.
Kreuter, C., Kinsbourne, M., and Tre-
varthen, C. L. (1972). Are decon-
nected cerebral hemispheres inde-
pendent channels? A preliminary
study of the effect of unilateral load-
ing on bilateral finger tapping. Neu-
ropsychologia 10, 453–461.
Lamme, V. A. F. (2003). Why visual
attention and awareness are differ-
ent. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 7,
12–18.
Levy, J., Trevarthen, C., and Sperry, R.
W. (1972). Perception of bilateral
chimeric figures following hemi-
spheric disconnection. Brain 95,
61–78.
Luck, S. J., Hillyard, S. A., Mangun,
G. R. and Gazzaniga, M. S. (1994).
Independent attentional scanning in
the separated hemispheres of split-
brain patients. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 6,
84–91.
McFarland, N. R., and Haber, S. N.
(2000). Convergent inputs from
thalamic motor nuclei and frontal
cortical areas to the dorsal stria-
tum in the primate. J. Neurosci. 20,
3798–3813.
McGurk, H., and MacDonald, J. (1976).
Hearing lips and seeing voices.
Nature 5588, 746–748.
Mink, J. W. (1996). The basal ganglia:
focused selection and inhibition of
competing motor programs. Prog.
Neurobiol. 50, 381–425.
Myers, R. E., and Sperry, R. W. (1958).
Interhemispheric communication
through the corpus callosum.
Arch. Neurol. Psychiatry 80,
298–303.
Nebes, R. (1974). Hemispheric special-
ization in commissurotomized man.
Psychol. Bull. 18, 1–14.
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology.
New York: Meredith Company.
Neisser, U. (1979). “The control of
information pickup in selective
looking,” in Perception and Its Devel-
opment: A tribute to Eleanor J.
Gibson, ed. A. D. Pick (Hills-
dale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates),
201–219.
Neumann, O. (1987). “Beyond capac-
ity: a functional view of attention,”in
Perspectives on Perception and Action,
ed. H. Sanders (Hillsdale: Erlbaum),
361–394.
Parent, M., and Parent, A. (2002).
Axonal collateralization in primate
basal ganglia and related thala-
mic nuclei. Thalamus Relat. Syst. 2,
71–86.
Parent, M. L., Lévesque, M., and Parent,
A. (1999). The pallidofugal projec-
tion system in primates: evidence for
neurons branching ipsilaterally and
contralaterally to the thalamus and
brainstem. J. Chem. Neuroanat. 16,
153–165.
Paus, T., Zijdenbos, A., Worsley, K.,
Collins, D. L., Blumenthal, J.,
Giedd, J. N., et al. (1999). Struc-
tural maturation of neural path-
ways in children and adoles-
cents: in vivo study. Science 283,
1908–1911.
Purves, D., and Lichtman, J. W. (1980).
Elimination of synapses in the devel-
oping neurvous system. Science 210,
153–157.
Redgrave, P., and Gurney, K. (2006).
The short-latency dopamine sig-
nal: a role in discovering novel
actions? Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7,
967–975.
Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., Nozawa, G., Gaz-
zaniga, M. S., and Hughes, H. C.
(1995). The fate of neglected tar-
gets in the callosotomized brain: a
chronometric analysis. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 21,
211–230.
Rosenblum, L. D. (2010). See What I’m
Saying: The Extraordinary Powers of
our Five Senses. New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Company Inc.
Sakai, K., Hikosaka, O., Miyauchi, S.,
Sasaki, Y., Fujimaki, N., and Pïtz,
B. (1999). Presupplementary motor
area activation during sequence
learning reflects visuo-motor asso-
ciation. J. Neurosci. 19, 1–6.
Schrier, A. M., and Sperry, R. W.
(1959). Visuo-motor integration
in split-brain cats. Science 129,
1275–1276.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward
signal of dopamine neurons. J. Neu-
rophysiol. 80, 1–27.
Shen, Y. C., and Franz, E. A. (2005).
Hemispheric competition in
left-handers on bimanual reaction
time tasks. J. Mot. Behav. 37, 3–9.
Shook, S. K., Franz, E. A., Higginson,
C. I., Wheelock, V. L., and Sigvardt,
K. A. (2005). Dopamine depen-
dency of cognitive switching and
response repetition effects in Parkin-
son’s disease. Neuropsychologia 43,
1990–1999.
Simons, D. J., and Chabris, C. F. (1999).
Gorillas in our midst: sustained
inattentional blindness for dynamic
events. Perception 28, 1059–1074.
Sokolov, E. N. (1963). Perception and the
Condition Reflex. Oxford: Pergamon
Press.
Solari, C., Drescher, K., and Goldstein,
R. E. (2011). The flagellarphotore-
sponse in volvox species (volvo-
caceae, chlorophyceae). J. Phycol. 47,
580–583.
Sperry, R. W. (1952). Neurology and the
mind-brain problem. Am. Sci. 40,
291–312.
Sperry, R. W. (1966). “Brain bisec-
tion and mechanisms of con-
sciousness,” in Brain and Conscious
Experience, Chap. 13, ed. J. C.
Eccles (New York: Springer-Verlag),
298–308.
Sperry, R. W. (1977). Forebrain
commissurotomy and conscious
awareness. J. Med. Philos. 2,
101–126.
Sperry, R. W. (1986). “Consciousness,
personal identity, and the divided
brain,” in Two Hemispheres – One
Brain: Functions of the Corpus callo-
sum eds F. Lapore, M. Ptito, and H.
H. Jasper (New York: Alan R. Liss,
Inc.), 3–20.
Sperry, R. W., Gazzaniga, M. S.,
and Bogen, J. E. (1969). “Inter-
hemispheric relationships: the neo-
cortical commissures; syndromes
of hemisphere disconnection,” in
Handbook of Clinical Neurology, Vol.
4, Chap. 14. eds P. J. Vinken
and G. W. Bruyn (Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Com-
pany), 273–290.
Sperry, R. W., Zaidel, E., and Zaidel, D.
(1979). Self recognition and social
awareness in the deconnected minor
hemisphere. Neuropsychologia 17,
153–166.
Takada, M., Tokuno, H., Nambu, A.,
Inase, M. (1998a). Corticostriatal
input zones from the supplementary
motor area overlap those from the
central-rather than ipsilateral pri-
mary motor cortex. Brain Res. 791,
335–340.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 535 | 14
Franz Attention for action
Takada, M., Tokuno, H., Nambu, A.,
and Inase, M. (1998b). Corticostri-
atal projections from the somatic
motor areas of the frontal cortex in
the macaque monkey: segregation
versus overlap of input zones from
the primary motor cortex, the
supplementary motor area, and the
premotor cortex. Exp. Brain Res. 120,
114–128.
Teng, E. L., and Sperry, R. W.
(1973). Interhemispheric interac-
tion during simultaneous bilateral
presentation of letters or digits in
commissurotomized patients. Neu-
ropsychologia 11, 131–140.
Thorndike, E. L. (1913). Ideo-motor
action. Psychol. Rev. 20, 91–106.
Troscianko, T., and Calvert, J.
(1993). Impaired parallel visual
search mechanisms in Parkin-
son’s disease: implications for
the role of dopamine in visual
attention. Clin. Vis. Sci. 8,
281–287.
Turney, S. G., and Lichtman, J.
W. (2012). Reversing the out-
come of synapse elimination at
developing neuromuscular junc-
tions in vivo: evidence for synap-
tic competition and its mech-
anism. PLoS Biol. 10:e1001352.
doi:10.1371/journal. pbio.1001352
Vallacher, R. R., and Wegner, D.
M. (1989). Levels of personal
agency: individual variation in
action identification. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 57, 660–671.
Yin, H. H., and Knowlton, B. J. (2006).
The role of the basal ganglia in
habit formation. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
7, 464–476.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 19 July 2012; accepted: 12
November 2012; published online: 21
December 2012.
Citation: Franz EA (2012) The allocation
of attention to learning of goal-directed
actions: a cognitive neuroscience frame-
work focusing on the basal gan-
glia. Front. Psychology 3:535. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00535
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Franz. This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License, which permits use, distrib-
ution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 535 | 15
